Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line with characterizations of egalitarian rules with solidarity in other economic models. We also show that we can replace order-preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy (on the subadditive domain) and still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class. We show that, in the model we consider, the welfare-egalitarian mechanisms appear to be the best candidates to satisfy several different fairness and solidarity requirements as well as generating bounded deficits.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2011|
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- MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., .
"Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1896, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Juan D Moreno-Ternero & John E Roemer, 2006. "Impartiality, Priority, and Solidarity in the Theory of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1419-1427, 09.
- MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2005. "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers 2005077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Murat Atlamaz & Duygu Yengin, 2008. "Fair Groves mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 573-587, December.
- Gines, M. & Marhuenda, F., 2000. "Welfarism in Economic Domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 191-204, August.
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