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Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems

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  • DUYGU YENGIN

Abstract

We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical-preferences lower-bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in an hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jpet.2013.15.issue-4
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Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 15 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
Pages: 580-601

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:15:y:2013:i:4:p:580-601
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
  • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
  • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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  1. Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2011. "Choosing and sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 296-300, September.
  2. Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September.
  3. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  4. Minehart, Deborah & Neeman, Zvika, 2002. "Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 303-324, March.
  5. Duygu Yengin, 2012. "Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 137-160, January.
  6. Murat Atlamaz & Duygu Yengin, 2008. "Fair Groves mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 573-587, December.
  7. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
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  9. Shinji Ohseto, 2006. "Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 111-121, September.
  10. Yengin Duygu, 2012. "Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-35, April.
  11. Moulin, Herve, 1991. "Welfare bounds in the fair division problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 321-337, August.
  12. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Axiomatizing Political Philosophy of Distributive Justice: Equivalence of No-envy and Egalitarian-equivalence with Welfare-egalitarianism," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  13. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  14. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  15. Fleurbaey, Marc, 1995. "Equality and responsibility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 683-689, April.
  16. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
  17. William Thomson, 2003. "On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 195-205, October.
  18. Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
  19. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 371-385, 06.
  20. Bevia, Carmen, 1996. "Population monotonicity in economies with one indivisible good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 125-137, October.
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Cited by:

  1. William Thomson, 2016. "Non-bossiness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 665-696, October.
  2. Duygu Yengin, 2017. "No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 81-108, January.
  3. Yengin Duygu, 2012. "Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-35, April.
  4. Paul Lehmann & Felix Creutzig & Melf-Hinrich Ehlers & Nele Friedrichsen & Clemens Heuson & Lion Hirth & Robert Pietzcker, 2012. "Carbon Lock-Out: Advancing Renewable Energy Policy in Europe," Energies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(2), pages 1-32, February.
  5. Yengin, Duygu, 2013. "Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 389-397.
  6. Duygu Yengin & Youngsub Chun, 2015. "Welfare Lower Bounds and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-11, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  7. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds," School of Economics Working Papers 2011-34, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

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