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Axiomatizing Political Philosophy of Distributive Justice: Equivalence of No-envy and Egalitarian-equivalence with Welfare-egalitarianism

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  • Duygu Yengin

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

Abstract

We characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with the two fundamental axioms of fairness: no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence. We consider cases where agents have equal rights over external world resources but are individually responsible for their preferences/costs. Our characterization answers the political philosophy question of what kind of welfare differentials allowed if we respect private ownership rights over self and public ownership over external world. We also relate no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence to "equality of what" debate and build a link between resource and opportunity egalitarianism, and welfare-egalitarianism.

Suggested Citation

  • Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Axiomatizing Political Philosophy of Distributive Justice: Equivalence of No-envy and Egalitarian-equivalence with Welfare-egalitarianism," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2011-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2011-19
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    File URL: https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp2011-19.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    2. Gines, M. & Marhuenda, F., 2000. "Welfarism in Economic Domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 191-204, August.
    3. Moulin, Herve & Roemer, John, 1989. "Public Ownership of the External World and Private Ownership of Self," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(2), pages 347-367, April.
    4. Tadenuma, Koichi & Thomson, William, 1993. "The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 117-132, February.
    5. Szilvia Pápai, 2003. "Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 371-385, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Chun, Youngsub & Yengin, Duygu, 2017. "Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 462-476.
    2. Duygu Yengin, 2013. "Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 580-601, August.
    3. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2014. "Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 425-442, June.
    4. Yengin, Duygu, 2013. "Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 389-397.
    5. Duygu Yengin, 2017. "No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 81-108, January.
    6. Duygu Yengin, 2011. "Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2011-34, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    egalitarianism; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; distributive justice; equality of opportunity; resource egalitarianism; private ownership of the self and public ownership of external world; NIMBY problems; allocation of indivisible goods and money; discrete public goods; strategy-proofness.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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