Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills
In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. Instead of Consistency of Resource Allocation across Dimension (CONRAD)[Roemer (1986, 1988)], which is essentially equivalent to the axiom of Welrfarism [Roemer (1988)], we introduce a weaker axiom, Consistency w.r.t. Technological Innovations (CTI), so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions)from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dwokin (1981, 1981a).
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