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Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills

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  • Yoshihara, Naoki

Abstract

In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. Instead of Consistency of Resource Allocation across Dimension (CONRAD)[Roemer (1986, 1988)], which is essentially equivalent to the axiom of Welrfarism [Roemer (1988)], we introduce a weaker axiom, Consistency w.r.t. Technological Innovations (CTI), so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions)from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dwokin (1981, 1981a).
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  • Yoshihara, Naoki, 2003. "Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 256-285, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:108:y:2003:i:2:p:256-285
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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 871-904, October.
    2. Yoshihara, Naoki, 2010. "Class and exploitation in general convex cone economies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 281-296, August.
    3. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2020. "Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Some Recent Developments," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 7-41, November.
    4. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2006. "Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 86-92, October.
    5. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel Lara, 2024. "Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 209-238, March.
    6. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2022. "Bargaining theory over opportunity assignments and the egalitarian solution," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(1), pages 198-219, February.
    7. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2008. "The Behaviour Of Solutions To Bargaining Problems On The Basis Of Solidarity," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 133-138, March.
    8. Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara, 2019. "An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 769-779, September.
    9. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2010. "Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 229-232, August.
    10. Veneziani, Roberto & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2010. "Exploitation and Profits: A General Axiomatic Approach in Convex Economies with Heterogeneous Agents," Discussion Paper Series 542, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Takashi Hayashi, 2020. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency in labour production economy with unequal skills," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, April.
    12. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2020. "Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 60-67.
    13. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2010. "Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 229-232, August.
    14. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel de Lara, 2021. "Bargaining On Monotonic Economic Environments," Working Papers hal-03206724, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being

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