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Alternative Characterizations of the Proportional Solution for Nonconvex Bargaining Problems with Claims

  • Michele Lombardi

    (Queen Mary, University of London)

  • Naoki Yoshihara

    ()

    (Hitotsubashi University)

We provide three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims that are not necessarily convex. One characterization result is obtained by using, together with other standard axioms, two solidarity axioms. Another characterization theorem shows that the single-valuedness axiom is dispensable even within the class of nonconvex problems if the standard symmetry axiom is imposed.

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File URL: http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk/papers/doc/wp632.pdf
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Paper provided by Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 632.

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Date of creation: Jul 2008
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Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp632
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  1. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2006. "The behavior of solutions to bargaining problems on the basis of solidarity," Discussion Paper Series a474, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  3. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
  4. Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 413-421.
  5. Naoki Yoshihara, 2000. "Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions in Production Economies with Unequal Skills," Discussion Paper Series a396, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Mariotti, Marco, 1999. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 733-41, July.
  7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  8. Chun, Y. & Thomson, W., 1989. "Bargaining Problems With Claims," RCER Working Papers 189, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  9. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  10. Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  11. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2006. "Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 86-92, October.
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