Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims
Three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims are provided. Two new contraction-type and expansion-type axioms are used. Moreover, the single-valuedness axiom is dispensable if the classical symmetry axiom is imposed.
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