Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems
This paper studies the Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. The Nash solution in such a context is typically multi-valued. We introduce a procedure to exclude some options recommended by the Nash solution. The procedure is based on the idea of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution which has the same informational requirement on individual utilities as the Nash solution does and has an equity consideration as well. We then use this procedure to introduce two new solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems and study them axiomatically.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2011|
|Note:||This Version: 23 June 2011, An earlier version of the paper was presented at the SEA meetings in Atlanta, Georgia, November 2010 and at the CEPET meeting in Udine, Italy, June 2011.|
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