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The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: Experimental evidence

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  • Fabio Galeotti

    (University of Lyon)

  • Maria Montero

    (University of Nottingham)

  • Anders Poulsen

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

The Attraction Effect and Compromise Effect (AE and CE) were introduced for individual choice situations. We define and experimentally investigate the AE and CE for bargaining situations. Our data suggest that the AE and CE are significant in bargaining, when certain conditions, related to focal equilibrium selection criteria based on payoff equality, efficiency, and symmetry, are met.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2017. "The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: Experimental evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:wcbess:17-04
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; attraction effect; compromise effect; focality; equality; efficiency; symmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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