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References listed on IDEAS
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Steven J. Brams & Ann E. Doherty, 1993. "Intransigence in Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 692-708, December.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Brams,Steven J. & Taylor,Alan D., 1996. "Fair Division," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521556446.
- Richard F. Potthoff & Steven J. Brams, 1998. "Proportional Representation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 147-178, April.
- Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
- Leonid Hurwicz, 1996. "Institutions As Families Of Game Forms," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 113-132, June.
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- Ronan Congar & Vincent Merlin, 2012.
"A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 131-147, January.
- Ronan Congar & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting," Post-Print halshs-00554833, HAL.
- repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9412-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2012.
"Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects,"
Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2009. "Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 7414, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz, 2009. "Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects," Working Papers 2009-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Steven Brams & Michael Jones & D. Kilgour, 2005. "Forming stable coalitions: The process matters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 67-94, July.
- Fabio Galeotti, 2017.
"The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence,"
- Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2017. "The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: Experimental evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 17-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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- repec:spr:grdene:v:13:y:2004:i:4:d:10.1023_b:grup.0000042925.01972.ad is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spr:grdene:v:23:y:2014:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-013-9345-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-010-9195-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 2012. "The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 23-42, January.
More about this item
Keywordsbargaining; Condorcet alternative; impasse; implementation; Nash equilibrium; social choice;
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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