A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting
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Other versions of this item:
- Ronan Congar & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 131-147, January.
References listed on IDEAS
- Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1986. "General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 109-127, April.
- repec:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1011252808608 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
- Fuad Aleskerov & Vyacheslav Chistyakov & Valery Kalyagin, 2010. "Social threshold aggregations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(4), pages 627-646, October.
- Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1982. "Implementability via protective equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 49-65, June.
- Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Fallback Bargaining," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 287-316, July.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Brian Hill, 2012. "Confidence in preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 273-302, July.
- repec:spr:grdene:v:24:y:2015:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-014-9412-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Vashchelyuk, N.V. (Ващелюк, Н.В.) & Polbin, Andrey (Полбин, Андрей) & Trunin, Pavel (Трунин, Павел), 2016.
"The Econometric Estimation of the Macroeconomic Effects of the Shock of Monetary Policy for the Russian Economy
[Эконометрическая Оценка Макроэкономических Эффектов Шока Денежно-Кредитной Политики ," Working Papers 2133, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
More about this item
Keywordsmaximin; voting; ignorance; duplication; separability; scoring rules;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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