IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v151y2025icp148-161.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stable mixing in Hawk–Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Arigapudi, Srinivas
  • Heller, Yuval

Abstract

The hawk–dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium, in which players in one population play “hawk” and players in the other population play “dove,” and a symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literature shows that when two populations of agents are randomly matched to play the hawk–dove game, then there is convergence to one of the pure equilibria from almost any initial state. By contrast, we show that plausible dynamics, in which agents occasionally revise their actions based on the payoffs obtained in a few trials, often give rise to the opposite result: convergence to one of the interior stationary states.

Suggested Citation

  • Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval, 2025. "Stable mixing in Hawk–Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 148-161.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:151:y:2025:i:c:p:148-161
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825625000387
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 85-104, July.
    2. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Igal Milchtaich, 2020. "Instability of Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics," Papers 2005.05779, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
    3. Yuval Salant & Josh Cherry, 2020. "Statistical Inference in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1725-1752, July.
    4. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2012. "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2897-2922, October.
    5. Sethi, Rajiv, 2021. "Stable sampling in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    6. Gary Bornstein & David Budescu & Shmuel Zamir, 1997. "Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(3), pages 384-406, June.
    7. Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020. "The evolution of taking roles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 38-63.
    8. Arieli, Itai & Arigapudi, Srinivas, 2024. "Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 377-387.
    9. William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 107-116.
    10. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2020. "The Strategy and Technology of Conflict," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(8), pages 3186-3219.
    11. Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 834-847, September.
    12. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Fallback Bargaining," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 287-316, July.
    13. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Lahkar, Ratul, 2024. "Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    14. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-1399, November.
    15. Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1987. "Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 833-850, September.
    16. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
    17. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2023. "Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 126-142.
    18. , & , H. & ,, 2015. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    19. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2022. "Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    20. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    21. Oprea, Ryan & Henwood, Keith & Friedman, Daniel, 2011. "Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from continuous time laboratory games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2206-2225.
    22. Bradley J Larsen, 2021. "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 851-882.
    23. Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2003. "Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 434-441, November.
    24. repec:fth:iniesr:487 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Lipnowski, Irwin & Maital, Shlomo, 1983. "Voluntary provision of a pure public good as the game of `chicken'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 381-386, April.
    26. repec:hhs:iuiwop:487 is not listed on IDEAS
    27. Berkemer, Rainer & Starke, Jens & Kawamoto, Atsushi, 2023. "Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 339-356.
    28. ,, 2006. "Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 207-231, June.
    29. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2020. "Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    30. Balkenborg, Dieter & Schlag, Karl H., 2007. "On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 295-315, March.
    31. Nax, Heinrich H. & Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N. & West, Stuart A. & Young, H. Peyton, 2016. "Learning in a black box," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68714, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    32. Nax, Heinrich H. & Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N. & West, Stuart A. & Young, H. Peyton, 2016. "Learning in a black box," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 1-15.
    33. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval & Milchtaich, Igal, 2021. "Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    34. Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin, 2023. "Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 294-316.
    35. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01157537 is not listed on IDEAS
    36. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2019. "Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    37. Juan Camilo Cárdenas & César Mantilla & Rajiv Sethi, 2015. "Stable Sampling Equilibrium in Common Pool Resource Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-19, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval & Schreiber, Amnon, 2021. "Sampling Dynamics and Stable Mixing in Hawk–Dove Games," MPRA Paper 108819, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Amnon Schreiber, 2021. "Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games," Papers 2107.08423, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    3. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Amnon Schreiber, 2023. "Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination," Papers 2305.10301, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2025.
    4. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2022. "Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    5. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2023. "Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 126-142.
    6. Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin, 2023. "Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 294-316.
    7. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval & Milchtaich, Igal, 2021. "Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    8. Ryoji Sawa, 2022. "Statistical Inference in Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers e170, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    9. Sethi, Rajiv, 2021. "Stable sampling in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    10. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Igal Milchtaich, 2020. "Instability of Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics," Papers 2005.05779, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
    11. Arigapudi, Srinivas, 2024. "Evolutionary dynamics in bilingual games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    12. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval & Milchtaich, Igal, 2020. "Instability of Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics Analysis," MPRA Paper 99594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    14. Srinivas Arigapudi & Omer Edhan & Yuval Heller & Ziv Hellman, 2022. "Mentors and Recombinators: Multi-Dimensional Social Learning," Papers 2205.00278, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    15. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Lahkar, Ratul, 2024. "Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    16. Berkemer, Rainer & Starke, Jens & Kawamoto, Atsushi, 2023. "Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 339-356.
    17. Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Sandholm, William H., 2019. "An introduction to ABED: Agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 434-462.
    18. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2019. "Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    19. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2020. "Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    20. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:151:y:2025:i:c:p:148-161. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.