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The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Sandeep Baliga

    (Northwestern)

  • Tomas Sjostrom

    (Rutgers)

Abstract

Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by "extremists" who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a "hawkish extremist" can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a "fear-spiral" of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a "dovish extremist" (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2009. "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict," Departmental Working Papers 200906, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200906
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    File URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2009-06.pdf
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    Cited by:

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    2. Christophe Muller & Pierre Pecher, 2021. "Terrorism, Insurgency, State Repression, and Cycles of Violence," Working Papers halshs-03134347, HAL.
    3. Sidartha Gordon & Alessandro Riboni, 2015. "Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 1790-1817, December.
    4. Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 359-402, February.
    5. Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014. "Dynamic strategic information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
    6. Kolb, Aaron & Conitzer, Vincent, 2020. "Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    7. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2023. "Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 957-992, December.
    8. Efraim Benmelech & Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2010. "Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions," NBER Working Papers 16493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2015. "Do polls create momentum in political competition?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 1-14.
    10. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Andrew J. Monaco & Tarun Sabarwal, 2016. "Games with strategic complements and substitutes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(1), pages 65-91, June.
    12. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2020. "War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 998-1013.
    13. Piotr Evdokimov & Umberto Garfagnini, 2018. "Third-party manipulation of conflict: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(1), pages 27-49, March.
    14. Hoffmann, Eric J. & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2019. "Global games with strategic complements and substitutes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 72-93.
    15. Ren Tan & Kairong Hong, 2021. "Research on Extreme Dispute Decisions of Large-Scale Engineering Projects from the Perspective of Multidimensional Preferences," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(22), pages 1-24, November.
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1pol0t9ish8aibtfnljt1dn7he is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Basu, Pathikrit & Dutta, Souvik & Shekhar, Suraj, 2019. "Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: A cheap talk game with multiple audiences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
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    19. Bruno Salcedo, 2019. "Persuading part of an audience," Papers 1903.00129, arXiv.org.
    20. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Amnon Schreiber, 2021. "Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games," Papers 2107.08423, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    21. Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia & Brayan Snehider Díaz, 2022. "Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(73), pages 17-42, February.
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    24. Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2019. "Partisan lobbyists in conflicts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

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    global strategy;

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    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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