It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the democratic peace hypothesis (i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another). We show that, when information asymmetries and strategic complements are present in the conflict resolution game, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from that of any other dyad. In our model, the interaction of two democracies produces the highest probability that a conflict will be peacefully resolved. But, it takes two democracies for peace; a conflict involving only one democracy will not be resolved in a peaceful way more often than a conflict involving two nondemocratic regimes. (JEL: D82, D74) Copyright (c) 2004 by the European Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 2 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
544, David K. Levine.
- Lones Smith & Ennio Stacchetti, 2002. "Aspirational Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0201003, EconWPA.
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- Farrell, J. & Gibbons, R., 1989.
"Cheap Talk With Two Audiences,"
518, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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