It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace
In this Paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increase the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2003|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Lones Smith & Ennio Stacchetti, 2002. "Aspirational Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0201003, EconWPA.
- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
- repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Farrell, J. & Gibbons, R., 1989.
"Cheap Talk With Two Audiences,"
518, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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