International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013.
"The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?,"
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- Dreher, Axel & Klasen, Stephan & Raymond, James & Werker, Eric, 2010. "The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 97, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
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Keywordsinternational institutions; information transmission; legitimacy; domestic politics;
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