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International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy

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  • Terrence L. Chapman

    (Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia)

Abstract

Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the informational role of international institutions. However, several questions about the informational aspects of institutional behavior remain underexplored: What determines how audiences respond to institutional decisions? Through what channels does information provision affect foreign policy? To answer these questions, I develop a formal model motivated by recent literature on the informational effects of security institutions. The formal model depicts information transmission between a domestic audience, an international institution, and a foreign policy maker. Statements issued by member states through the institution serve to inform the audience about the likely outcomes of its leader’s actions. The model demonstrates that leaders have incentives to consult relatively conservative institutions, because their support convinces audiences that they should also support proposed policies. Leaders face incentives to avoid the disapproval of more revisionist institutions, because their opposition will tend to induce public opposition. The empirical implications are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Terrence L. Chapman, 2007. "International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 134-166, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:1:p:134-166
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    Cited by:

    1. Axel Dreher & Stephan Klasen & James Raymond Vreeland & Eric Werker, 2013. "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(1), pages 157-191.
    2. Dreher, Axel & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2011. "Buying votes and international organizations," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 123, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    3. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 59(1), pages 120-148, February.
    4. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
    5. repec:got:cegedp:123 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:got:cegedp:97 is not listed on IDEAS

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