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Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements

  • Mansfield, Edward D.
  • Milner, Helen V.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter

Over the past fty years, barriers to international trade havedecreased substantially. While the decline in protectionism since WorldWar II has stemmed partly from unilateral changes in trade policy bycountries, it has also been a result of agreements among countries toliberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the conditions underwhich states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explorethe domestic factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We arguethat the likelihood of states cooperating on trade policy dependscrucially on their regime type: as states become more democratic, theyare increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements.

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Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 56 (2002)
Issue (Month): 03 (June)
Pages: 477-513

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Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:03:p:477-513_44
Contact details of provider: Postal: Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK
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