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Buying Votes and International Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Axel Dreher

    (Heidelberg University)

  • James Raymond Vreeland

    (Georgetown University)

Abstract

This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Dreher & James Raymond Vreeland, 2011. "Buying Votes and International Organizations," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 78, Courant Research Centre PEG.
  • Handle: RePEc:got:gotcrc:078
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Le Breton & Peter Sudhölter & Vera Zaporozhets, 2012. "Sequential legislative lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 491-520, July.
    2. Dutta, Nabamita & Williamson, Claudia R., 2016. "Aiding economic freedom: Exploring the role of political institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 24-38.
    3. Shaomeng Jia & Claudia R. Williamson, 2019. "Aid, Policies, And Growth: Why So Much Confusion?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 577-599, October.
    4. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2014. "Rents and the Political Economy of Development Aid," Working Papers in Economics 07/14, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IMF; UN Security Council; Voting; Aid;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid

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