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Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization

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  • Ana Carolina Garriga

    (Department of Political Science University of Pittsburgh)

Abstract

How does domestic regime type affect bilateral cooperation, and one of its most visible manifestations, bilateral treaties? This article explains how domestic political regime affects bilateral cooperation and, contrary to the expectations of some scholars, why autocracies should be expected to be more likely than democracies to enter into bilateral treaties. If the preferences of a pair of states are not identical, the sets of agreements that each party would consent to (win-sets) need to overlap for a bilateral treaty to be acceptable. Because additional domestic constraints reduce the size of a country’s win-set, autocracies should have broader win-sets than democracies. Therefore, autocratic dyads should be more likely to formalize bilateral treaties than other pairs of states. Based on an original data set, I present empirical evidence showing that pairs of autocracies are more likely than other pairs of states to enter into agreements formalizing bilateral cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Carolina Garriga, 2009. "Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(5), pages 698-726, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:5:p:698-726
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002709341403
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    References listed on IDEAS

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