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Does compliance matter? Assessing the relationship between sovereign risk and compliance with international monetary law

  • Stephen Nelson


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    Article provided by Springer in its journal The Review of International Organizations.

    Volume (Year): 5 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 107-139

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:2:p:107-139
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    9. Rachel Glennerster & Yongseok Shin, 2008. "Does Transparency Pay?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 55(1), pages 183-209, April.
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    11. Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Progress of Global Integration," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1733, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    12. Axel Dreher & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200819, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    13. Feder, Gershon & Ross, Knud Z, 1982. " Risk Assessments and Risk Premiums in the Eurodollar Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(3), pages 679-91, June.
    14. Wacziarg, Romain & Welch, Karen Horn, 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence," Research Papers 1826, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    15. Mansfield, Edward D. & Milner, Helen V. & Rosendorff, B. Peter, 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(03), pages 477-513, June.
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    17. Bruce A. Blonigen & Miao Wang, 2004. "Inappropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor Countries in Empirical FDI Studies," NBER Working Papers 10378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(03), pages 379-406, June.
    19. Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, 2003. "Globalization and Capital Markets," NBER Chapters, in: Globalization in Historical Perspective, pages 121-188 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. McKinnon, Ronald I., 1979. "Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195024098.
    21. Archer, Candace C. & Biglaiser, Glen & DeRouen, Karl, 2007. "Sovereign Bonds and the : Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(02), pages 341-365, April.
    22. Abrevaya, Jason, 1997. "The equivalence of two estimators of the fixed-effects logit model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 41-43, August.
    23. Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor, 1996. "Democratic states and commitment in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(01), pages 109-139, December.
    24. Grieco, Joseph M. & Gelpi, Christopher F. & Warren, T. Camber, 2009. "When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Relative Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(02), pages 341-355, April.
    25. Fabian Valencia & Luc Laeven, 2008. "Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database," IMF Working Papers 08/224, International Monetary Fund.
    26. Mitchell, Ronald B., 1994. "Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(03), pages 425-458, June.
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    28. Jensen, Nathan M., 2003. "Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(03), pages 587-616, June.
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