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The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration

Listed author(s):
  • Barbara Dluhosch

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  • Nikolai Ziegler
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-011-9109-9
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 22 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 325-354

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:22:y:2011:i:4:p:325-354
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-011-9109-9
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/political+science/journal/10602/PS2

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    10. Dluhosch Barbara, 2010. "The Second-Mover Advantage in International Trade Negotiations," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-37, February.
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    12. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    13. K.C. Fung & Alan Siu, 2008. "Political Economy Of Service Trade Liberalization And The Doha Round," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 124-133, 02.
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    17. O'Rourke, Kevin Hjortshøj & Taylor, Alan M., 2006. "Democracy and Protectionism," CEPR Discussion Papers 5698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    19. Tom Ginsburg, 2009. "International delegation and state disaggregation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 323-340, September.
    20. Voigt, Stefan & Salzberger, Eli M, 2002. "Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 289-310.
    21. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2002. "Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 423-447, August.
    22. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-153, March.
    23. Segendorff, Bjorn, 1998. "Delegation and Threat in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 266-283, May.
    24. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2006. "Reciprocity and the hidden constitution of world trade," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 133-163, September.
    25. Macartan Humphreys, 2007. "Strategic ratification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 191-208, July.
    26. Daniel Finke & Thomas König, 2009. "Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 341-365, September.
    27. Hug, Simon & König, Thomas, 2002. "In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(02), pages 447-476, March.
    28. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen & Jack Robles, 2005. "Issue Linking in Trade Negotiations: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 185-204, 05.
    29. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
    30. Jones, Stephen R. G., 1989. "Have your lawyer call my lawyer : Bilateral delegation in bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 159-174, March.
    31. Harry G. Johnson, 1965. "An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 256-256.
    32. Rosendorff, B.P. & Milner, H., 1995. "Democratic Politics and International Trade Negociations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization," Papers 9511, Southern California - Department of Economics.
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