Democracy and Protectionism
Does democracy encourage free trade? It depends. Broadening the franchise involves transferring power from non-elected elites to the wider population, most of whom will be workers. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson logic says that democratization should lead to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade; and to more protectionist policies in countries where workers will benefit from the imposition of tariffs and quotas. We test and confirm these political economy implications of trade theory hypothesis using data on democracy, factor endowments, and protection in the late nineteenth century.
|Date of creation:||May 2006|
|Publication status:||published as Hatton, Timothy J., Kevin H. O’Rourke and Alan M. Taylor (eds.) The New Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson. MIT Press, 2007.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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