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Consitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes

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  • Olper, Alessandro
  • Raimondi, Valentina

Abstract

The analysis deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of 74 developing and developed countries, observed in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent develop in comparative politics that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. We focus the attention on the effect of both broad political reforms – reforms in (and out of) democracy – and on narrow details of democracy, such as electoral rules and forms of government. Using differences-in-differences estimation we find a positive effect of a transition into democracy on agricultural protection. However, the average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Transitions into parliamentary and, especially, proportional democracy – as opposed to presidential and majoritarian – appear to produce the most increase in agricultural protection and support.

Suggested Citation

  • Olper, Alessandro & Raimondi, Valentina, 2008. "Consitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 43870, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae08:43870
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Olper & Johan Swinnen, 2013. "Mass Media and Public Policy: Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, pages 413-436.
    2. Kym Anderson & Gordon Rausser & Johan Swinnen, 2013. "Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 423-477.
    3. Cornelius Hirsch & Harald Oberhofer, 2017. "Bilateral Trade Agreements and Trade Distortions in Agricultural Markets," FIW Working Paper series 176, FIW.
    4. Arovuori, Kyosti, 2015. "Empirical analysis on the development of policy objectives of the CAP," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 210960, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Anderson, Kym, 2009. "Political Economy of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: Introduction and Summary," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 50306, World Bank.
    6. Alessandro Olper & Jan Falkowski & Johan Swinnen, 2009. "Political Reforms and Public Policies: Evidence from Agricultural Protection," LICOS Discussion Papers 25109, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    7. Henning, Christian H.C.A. & Struve, Carsten & Brockmeier, Martina, 2008. "The logic of the CAP: Politics or Economics?," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 48639, World Bank.
    8. Johan F.M.Swinnen & Alessandro Olper & Thijs Vandemoortele, 2011. "The Political Economy of Policy Instrument Choice: Theory and Evidence from Agricultural Policies," LICOS Discussion Papers 27911, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    9. Moon, Wanki & Saldias, Gabriel Pino, 2013. "Public Preferences about Agricultural Protectionism in the US," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150718, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    10. Olper, Alessandro & Falkowski, Jan & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2009. "Democracy and Agricultural Protection: Parametric and Semi-parametric Matching Estimates," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49313, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob de Haan, 2013. "Conditional Election and Partisan Cycles in Government Support to the Agricultural Sector: An Empirical Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(4), pages 793-818.
    12. Gawande, Kishore & Hoekman, Bernard, 2009. "Why Governments Tax or Subsidize Trade: Evidence from Agriculture," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 50300, World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional Rules; Agricultural Protection; Differences-in-differences estimation; Agricultural and Food Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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