The size and the scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians
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- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1998. "The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians," Seminar Papers 658, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," NBER Working Papers 6848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," Papers 658, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-1998-11-20 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-1998-11-20 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-1998-11-20 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1998-11-20 (Public Finance)
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