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Electoral systems and corruption

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  • Vincenzo Verardi

Abstract

Recently, many scholars have tried to explain how electoral systems are linked to corruption. Several theories emerged but still no consensus has been reached. With a dataset of about 50 democratic countries considered over 10 years we try to understand which of the effects highlighted in the theoretical literature dominates. The results tend to show that larger voting districts (characterized by lower barriers to entry) are associated with less corruption, whereas closed lists tend to be associated with more The latter effect is nevertheless not robust. In aggregate, we find that majoritarian systems tend to be associated to higher levels of corruption than proportional representations. An additional finding is that presidential regimes tend to be associated with more corruption than parliamentary ones.
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Suggested Citation

  • Vincenzo Verardi, 2004. "Electoral systems and corruption," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9893, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/9893
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joanna Dzionek-Kozlowska, 2014. "Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists’ Lenses," Annales. Ethics in Economic Life, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, vol. 17(4), pages 79-92, December.

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    JEL classification:

    • Z00 - Other Special Topics - - General - - - General

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