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Growth, Governance and Corruption in the Presence of Threshold Effects: Theory and Evidence

Listed author(s):
  • Aidt, T.
  • Dutta, J.
  • Vania Sena

We study the joint determination of corruption and economic growth. Our model can generate multiple equilibria when complementarity between corruption and growth is sufficiently strong. Our estimates of the impact of corruption on growth take into account that corruption is endogenous and that there may exist different growth/corruption regimes. In a cross section of countries in the 1990s,we identify two regimes, conditional on the quality of political institutions. In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption has a negative impact on growth. In the regime with low quality institutions, corruption has, overall, little impact on growth, but, if anything, the impact is, surprisingly, positive.

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File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0540.pdf
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0540.

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Date of creation: Sep 2005
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0540
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/

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