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Distribution and development in a model of misgovernance

  • Blackburn, Keith
  • Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F.

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 51 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (August)
Pages: 1534-1563

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:6:p:1534-1563
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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