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Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance

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  • Blackburn, Keith
  • Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F.

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development.

Suggested Citation

  • Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2005. "Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 15, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3488
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; inequality; development.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

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