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The Injustice of Inequality

Listed author(s):
  • Edward L. Glaeser
  • Andrei Shleifer

In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form of corruption, intimidation, and other forms of influence. We present a model of such institutional subversion focusing specifically on courts and of the effects of inequality in economic and political resources on the magnitude of subversion. We then use the model to analyze the consequences of institutional subversion for the law and order environment in the country, as well as for capital accumulation and growth. We illustrate the model with historical evidence from Gilded Age United States and the transition economies of the 1990s. We also present some cross-country evidence consistent with the basic prediction of the model.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9150.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9150.

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Date of creation: Sep 2002
Publication status: published as Glaeser, Edward & Scheinkman, Jose & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The injustice of inequality," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 199-222, January.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9150
Note: EFG LE
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