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Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development

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  • James A. Robinson
  • Daron Acemoglu

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • James A. Robinson & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:2:p:126-130
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.2.126
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward C. Prescott & Stephen L. Parente, 1999. "Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1216-1233, December.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    3. James A. Robinson, 1999. "When is a State Predatory?," CESifo Working Paper Series 178, CESifo.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • O14 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology

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