Barriers to Technology Adoption and Entry
A key feature of recent work on barriers to technology adoption is the assumption that monopoly rights of insiders are limited by the ability of industry outsiders to enter. This paper endogenizes the decision of a government to provide barriers to technology adoption alone or in combination with barriers to entry of outsiders. Using a political economy model, we find that a government provides barriers to both technology adoption and outsider entry. If governments are not too "corrupt", restricting their ability to provide barriers to entry may eliminate barriers to adoption. However, for sufficiently "corrupt" governments, prohibiting barriers to entry leads to more extreme barriers to technology adoption.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Economic Policy Research Institute, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2|
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