Special Interests and Technological change
We study an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise between the young and the old, because the former favor innovation while the latter prefer learning. We model the interaction between overlapping generations and policy makers as a dynamic common agency problem, where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby either for the maintenance of the current technology or the adoption of a new one. By focusing on truthful Markov perfect equilibria, we characterize the political equilibrium and show its dependence on the underlying demographic, technological and preference parameters.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||Feb 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna|
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Edward C. Prescott, 1997.
"Needed: a theory of total factor productivity,"
242, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1997.
"Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1799, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1996.
"Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments,"
178, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1998. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1299-1329, September.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-lived Governments," CEPR Discussion Papers 1396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments," NBER Working Papers 5447, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman,G.M. & Helpman,E., 1996. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governements," Papers 2-96, Tel Aviv.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1998.
"Dynamic Common Agency,"
1259, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1996.
" Auctions: An Introduction,"
Journal of Economic Surveys,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 367-420, December.
- Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
- Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. " Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-84, December.
- repec:oup:restud:v:63:y:1996:i:2:p:301-29 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997.
"Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,"
3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
- Levine, Ross & Renelt, David, 1991.
"A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
609, The World Bank.
- Levine, Ross & Renelt, David, 1992. "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 942-63, September.
- Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1997. "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 243-272, January.
- James M. Snyder, 1991. "On Buying Legislatures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 93-109, 07.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:340. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Luca Miselli to update the entry or send us the correct email address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.