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Is Policy Ownership An Operational Concept?

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  • Mr. James M. Boughton
  • Mr. Alex Mourmouras

Abstract

IMF lending is generally conditional on specified policies and outcomes. These conditions usually are negotiated compromises between policies initially favored by the Fund and by the country's authorities. In some cases the authorities might be satisfied enough with the outcome to take responsibility for it ("own" it) even though it was not their original preference. In other cases, they might accept the outcome only to obtain financing, in which case weak commitment might lead to poor implementation. This paper reviews the theoretical basis for the importance of ownership, summarizes what is known about its empirical effects, and suggests a strategy for strengthening it.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. James M. Boughton & Mr. Alex Mourmouras, 2002. "Is Policy Ownership An Operational Concept?," IMF Working Papers 2002/072, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2002/072
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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Paloni & Maurizio Zanardi, 2006. "Development Policy Lending, Conditionality, and Ownership: A Dynamic Agency Model Perspective," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 253-266, May.
    2. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, September.
    3. Calliope Spanou, 2016. "Policy conditionality, structural adjustment and the domestic policy system. Conceptual framework and research agenda," RSCAS Working Papers 2016/60, European University Institute.
    4. Carsten Hefeker & Katharina Michaelowa, 2005. "Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 159-175, January.
    5. Hefeker, Carsten & Michaelowa, Katharina, 2003. "Can Process Conditionality Enhance Aid Effectiveness? The Role of Bureaucratic Interest and Public Pressure," Discussion Paper Series 26389, Hamburg Institute of International Economics.
    6. Mariarosaria Agostino, 2004. "Conditionality, Commitment and Investment Response in LDCs," Economics Working Papers 2004-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    7. Graham Bird, 2008. "The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 41-64, March.
    8. Mr. Yaya Moussa, 2004. "Public Expenditure Management in Francophone Africa: A Cross-Country Analysis," IMF Working Papers 2004/042, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, 2007. "Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Back to Per Jacobsson’s time," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 329-343, December.
    10. Mr. Rodney Ramcharan, 2002. "How Does Conditional Aid (Not) Work?," IMF Working Papers 2002/183, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Allan Drazen & Peter Isard, 2004. "Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership?," NBER Working Papers 10927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Kolavalli, Shashidhara & Flaherty, Kathleen & Al-Hassan, Ramatu & Baah, Kwaku Owusu, 2010. "Do Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) Processes Make a Difference to Country Commitments to Develop Agriculture?," IFPRI discussion papers 1006, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    13. Mr. Rodney Ramcharan, 2003. "Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 2003/192, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 241-252, May.
    15. Mr. Alex Mourmouras & Anna Ivanova & Mr. George C Anayiotos & Mr. Wolfgang Mayer, 2003. "What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?," IMF Working Papers 2003/008, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Bergamaschi, Isaline, 2016. "The politics of aid and poverty reduction in Africa: A conceptual proposal and the case of Mali," Global Cooperation Research Papers 16, University of Duisburg-Essen, Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR21).
    17. Mr. James M. Boughton, 2003. "Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs," IMF Working Papers 2003/191, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Rodney Ramcharan, 2004. "Debt “Hold Up†and International Lending," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 462, Econometric Society.
    19. Graham Bird, 2003. "The Implementation of IMF Programmes: A Conceptual Framework and a Policy Agenda," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1003, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    20. Rodney Ramcharan, 2004. "Debt Hold Up and International Lending," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 341, Econometric Society.
    21. Committeri, Marco & L´Hotellerie-Fallois, Pilar & Algarra, Monica & Balteanu, Irina & Eijking, Carlijn & Estefanía, Julia & Gallego, Sonsoles & Garelli, Serena & Gibson, Heather & Heinbuecher, Robert , 2019. "Conditionality and design of IMF-supported programmes," Occasional Paper Series 235, European Central Bank.
    22. Mr. Peter Isard & Allan Drazen, 2004. "Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership?," IMF Working Papers 2004/163, International Monetary Fund.
    23. Matteo Alessandro Bobba, 2004. "The Determinants of IMF Loan Programs," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(6), pages 21-48, November-.

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