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The political economy of international trade and factor mobility

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  • Giovanni Facchini

Abstract

. Free trade in goods and factors is efficient. When we move away from economic theory and consider the policies actually followed by governments, we observe distortions being implemented both on goods and factors trades. It is natural then to question the relative merits of the two types of intervention, and the normative literature has provided only partial answers. We ask then why is the international flow of goods and factors not free, and the political economy literature has looked at the two issues only separately. In studying the determination of trade policy, a theoretical paradigm has emerged, focusing on the role of influence driven contributions. This approach has also found strong empirical support. The literature on the political economy of factor mobility, on the other hand, is fragmented. Distortions in labor and capital flows are typically the subject of different studies, and only recently a unified framework has been proposed. More work has to be done in this area as well as in integrating the political economy of trade and factor movements.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Facchini, 2004. "The political economy of international trade and factor mobility," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 1-32, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:18:y:2004:i:1:p:1-32
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2004.00214.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    2. Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa, 2009. "Who Is Against a Common Market?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(5), pages 1068-1100, September.
    3. Marfouk, Abdeslam, 2013. "Préjugés et fausses idées sur l’immigration et les immigrés, vecteurs de discrimination en matière d’accès à l’emploi [false ideas about immigrants and immigration and discrimination in labor marke," MPRA Paper 47989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. repec:pra:mprapa:47899 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Facchini, Giovanni & Willmann, Gerald, 2005. "The political economy of international factor mobility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 201-219, September.
    6. Sebastian Galiani & Gustavo Torrens, 2021. "The political economy of trade and international labour mobility," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(4), pages 1737-1781, November.
    7. Cyrille Schwellnus, 2008. "The Non‐Traded Sector, Lobbying, And The Choice Between The Customs Union And The Common Market," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 361-390, November.

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