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Fiscal decentralization, endogenous policies, and foreign direct investment: Theory and evidence from China and India

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  • Wang, Yong

Abstract

A political-economy model is developed to explain why fiscal decentralization may have a non-monotonic effect on FDI inflows through endogenous policies. Too much fiscal decentralization hurts central government incentives, whereas too little fiscal decentralization renders the local governments vulnerable to capture by the protectionist special interest groups. Moreover, the local government's preference for FDI can be endogenously polarized; therefore, a small change in fiscal decentralization across certain threshold values may lead to a dramatic difference in equilibrium FDI inflows. Empirical investigations support the idea that the difference in fiscal decentralization is an important reason for the nine-fold difference in FDI per capita between China and India. Cross-country regression results also support the inverted-U relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Yong, 2013. "Fiscal decentralization, endogenous policies, and foreign direct investment: Theory and evidence from China and India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 107-123.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:103:y:2013:i:c:p:107-123 DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.01.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Nitsche, Christin & Schröder, Michael, 2015. "Are SRI funds conventional funds in disguise or do they live up to their name?," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-027, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    2. Aslim, Erkmen Giray & Neyapti, Bilin, 2017. "Optimal fiscal decentralization: Redistribution and welfare implications," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 224-234.
    3. Xi Li & Xuewen Liu & Yong Wang, 2015. "A Model of China's State Capitalism," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2015-12, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Feb 2015.
    4. Wang, Li & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schröder, Michael & Xu, Xian, 2015. "Politicians' promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 216, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    5. Reddy, Kotapati Srinivasa, 2015. "Revisiting and Reinforcing the Farmers Fox Theory: A Study (Test) of Three Cases in Cross-border Inbound Acquisitions," MPRA Paper 63561, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.
    6. Wang, Yong, 2015. "A model of sequential reforms and economic convergence: The case of China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-26.
    7. Wu, Yan & Heerink, Nico, 2016. "Foreign direct investment, fiscal decentralization and land conflicts in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 92-107.
    8. Reddy, Kotapati Srinivasa, 2015. "Determinants of Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions: A Comprehensive Review and Future Direction," MPRA Paper 63969, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.
    9. Xie, En & Reddy, K.S. & Liang, Jie, 2017. "Country-specific determinants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions: A comprehensive review and future research directions," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 127-183.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal decentralization; FDI; Sequential lobby; Technology adoption; Growth and development; China and India;

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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