Trade Openness, Institutional Change and Economic Growth
This paper explores the relationship between trade openness and economic growth through a change in institutions. To do so, the paper creates a theory of endogenous institutional change where there are three social groups, each one owns a specific production factor. An ellite (landowners) controlling the political power fix higher taxes to extract rents from the other groups of the society (capitalists). This reduces investment in capital, the source for endogenous growth. Endogenous institutional change is done by allowing the rival group (capitalists) to invest in a military action which expels out the group in power. The model studies optimal taxation, growth and institutional change under two scenarios, autarky and free trade. The model is calibrated according to the Western European experience in the Modern Age. Generally, economies opened to trade will experiment higher growth and earlier institutional change although economies specializing in manufacturing products tend to grow more and rise the institutional change earlier. These results are qualitatively very robust to change in parameter values.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.uam.es/departamentos/economicas/analecon/default.htmlEmail:
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rivera-Batiz, Luis A & Romer, Paul M, 1991.
"Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 531-55, May.
- Josef Falkinger & Volker Grossmann, 2005.
"Institutions and Development: The Interaction Between Trade Regime and Political System,"
Journal of Economic Growth,
Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 231-272, 09.
- Josef Falkinger & Volker Grossmann, 2004. "Institutions and Development: The Interaction between Trade Regime and Political System," CESifo Working Paper Series 1279, CESifo Group Munich.
- Falkinger, Josef & Grossmann, Volker, 2004. "Institutions and Development: The Interaction between Trade Regime and Political System," IZA Discussion Papers 1242, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ruben Segura-Cayuela, 2006.
"Inefficient Policies, Inefficient Institutions and Trade,"
2006 Meeting Papers
502, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Rubén Segura-Cayuela, 2006. "Inefficient policies, inefficient institutions and trade," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0633, Banco de Espa�a.
- O Rourke, Kevin H. & Williamson, Jeffrey G., 2002.
"When did globalisation begin?,"
European Review of Economic History,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(01), pages 23-50, April.
- Eicher, Theo & García-Peñalosa, Cecilia, 2008. "Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 237-258, February.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999.
"Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?,"
NBER Working Papers
6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116, February.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"Do Institutions Cause Growth?,"
NBER Working Papers
10568, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lvarez-Nogal, Carlos & Prados De La Escosura, Leandro, 2007. "The decline of Spain (1500 1850): conjectural estimates," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(03), pages 319-366, December.
- Oded Galor & Omer Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2005. "Land Inequality and the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions," Development and Comp Systems 0502018, EconWPA.
- Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 1997. "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of Institutional Explanation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 590-602, July.
- Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott, 2002. "Barriers to Riches," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661306, June.
- Gonzalez, Francisco M., 2007. "Effective property rights, conflict and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 127-139, November.
- Young, Alwyn, 1991. "Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 369-405, May.
- Alwyn Young, 1991. "Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 3577, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matthias Doepke & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2005. "Social Class and the Spirit of Capitalism," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(2-3), pages 516-524, 04/05.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uam:wpaper:200905. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Raúl López-Pérez)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.