The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements
Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free-trade agreement. Will a free-trade agreement between these countries be politically viable and, if so, what form will it take? The authors address these questions using a political-economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between industry special-interest groups and an incumbent government. They describe the economic conditions necessary for a free-trade agreement to be an equilibrium outcome, both for the case when the agreement must cover all bilateral trade and for the case when a few politically sensitive sectors can be excluded from the agreements. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 85 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
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