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The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: The Italian case

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  • Alfano, Maria Rosaria
  • Baraldi, Anna Laura
  • Cantabene, Claudia

Abstract

The effects of electoral systems on corruption have been widely studied in economic and political literature. However, in explaining this relationship, very little attention has been paid to the role of political competition. We hypothesize that the degree of proportionality of the electoral system has a direct and indirect impact on corruption, via the degree of electoral competition among political parties. The estimated results, on a sample of the 20 Italian regions over 26 years, show that both the direct and the indirect effects are relevant in explaining corruption. As the electoral system becomes more proportional, corruption directly decreases. This beneficial effect can be reinforced or reduced depending on how the variation in political competition follows a variation in the degree of proportionality of the electoral system.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfano, Maria Rosaria & Baraldi, Anna Laura & Cantabene, Claudia, 2013. "The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: The Italian case," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 1-10.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:47:y:2013:i:c:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2013.07.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:bla:jecsur:v:32:y:2018:i:2:p:335-356 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Eugen Dimant & Guglielmo Tosato, 2018. "Causes And Effects Of Corruption: What Has Past Decade'S Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 335-356, April.
    3. Maria Rosaria Alfano & Anna Laura Baraldi, 2015. "The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: an extension," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 4(1), pages 5-24, June.
    4. Miguel Ángel Borrella Mas, 2015. "Partisan Alignment and Political Corruption. Theory and Evidence from Spain Job Market Paper," Working Papers. Serie AD 2015-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political competition; Electoral systems; Corruption;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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