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Active and passive corruption: Theory and evidence

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  • Capasso, Salvatore
  • Santoro, Lodovico

Abstract

Focusing on the idea that a different allocation of bargaining power between the public official and the private agent can explain the emergence of two types of corruption, this paper develops a theoretical model which provides an account of different level of bribes and incentives when the bargaining power is in the hands of the official (active corruption) or in the hands of the private agent (passive corruption). By employing Italian data which explicitly differentiate between active and passive corruption, the paper empirically re-examines the determinants of the aggregate level corruption. The results show that the various categories of government expenditure, which proxy different allocations of bargaining power, differently affect active and passive corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Capasso, Salvatore & Santoro, Lodovico, 2018. "Active and passive corruption: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 103-119.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:52:y:2018:i:c:p:103-119
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.05.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Kravtsova & Aleksey Oshchepkov, 2019. "Market And Network Corruption," HSE Working papers WP BRP 209/EC/2019, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Alfredo Monte & Luca Pennacchio, 2020. "Corruption, Government Expenditure and Public Debt in OECD Countries," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 62(4), pages 739-771, December.
    3. Vincenzo Alfano & Salvatore Capasso & Rajeev K. Goel, 2021. "EU accession: A boon or bane for corruption?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 45(1), pages 1-21, January.
    4. Salvatore Capasso & Lorenzo Cicatiello & Elina De Simone & Lodovico Santoro, 2022. "Corruption and tax revenues: Evidence from Italian regions," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(4), pages 1129-1152, December.
    5. Salvatore Capasso & Rajeev K. Goel & James W. Saunoris, 2019. "Is it the gums, teeth or the bite? Effectiveness of dimensions of enforcement in curbing corruption," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 329-369, December.
    6. Vincenzo Alfano & Salvatore Capasso & Lodovico Santoro, 2023. "Corruption and the political system: some evidence from Italian regions," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 9(2), pages 665-695, July.
    7. Emanuel Wittberg & Mihály Fazekas, 2023. "Firm performance, imperfect competition, and corruption risks in procurement: evidence from Swedish municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 227-251, October.
    8. Alfredo Monte & Luca Pennacchio, 0. "Corruption, Government Expenditure and Public Debt in OECD Countries," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 0, pages 1-33.
    9. Malkina, M. & Ovchinnikov, V., 2020. "Influence of regulatory burden and involvement of business in corruption on revenue: Grease vs sand effect," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 40-65.
    10. Federico Ceschel & Alessandro Hinna & Fabian Homberg, 2022. "Public Sector Strategies in Curbing Corruption: A Review of the Literature," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 571-591, September.
    11. Zeeshan, Muhammad & han, Jiabin & Rehman, Alam & Ullah, Irfan & Hussain, Arif & Alam Afridi, Fakhr E., 2022. "Exploring symmetric and asymmetric nexus between corruption, political instability, natural resources and economic growth in the context of Pakistan," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    12. Gheorghița Dincă & Marius Sorin Dincă & Camelia Negri & Mihaela Bărbuță, 2021. "The Impact of Corruption and Rent-Seeking Behavior upon Economic Wealth in the European Union from a Public Choice Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-23, June.
    13. Aidt, Toke S. & Hillman, Arye L. & Qijun, LIU, 2020. "Who takes bribes and how much? Evidence from the China Corruption Conviction Databank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C33; D73; H72; H75; H57; Active corruption; Passive corruption; Bargaining power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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