A Big Push to Deter Corruption: Evidence from Italy
During the first half of the 1990s a pool of Italian judges carried out an investigation, named Mani Pulite (literally clean hands), that led many public officials to be prosecuted and convicted because of bribery and embezzlement. The impact of Mani Pulite was so much influential that since then many indicators suggest a steadily decreasing path for corruption in Italy. This paper shows that Mani Pulite was mainly effective in deterring corruption as it broke up the feed due to spending in health and social security as well as infrastructure investments, mainly those related to public buildings, sanitation, and land reclamation.
|Date of creation:||01 Jun 2006|
|Date of revision:||01 May 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 2008,n. 67(1), pages 75-102.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: I-80126 Napoli|
Phone: +39 081 - 675372
Fax: +39 081 - 675372
Web page: http://www.csef.it/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Del Monte, Alfredo & Papagni, Erasmo, 2007. "The determinants of corruption in Italy: Regional panel data analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 379-396, June.
- Miriam A. Golden & Lucio Picci, 2005. "Proposal For A New Measure Of Corruption, Illustrated With Italian Data," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 37-75, 03.
- Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000.
"The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
- Rauch, James E & Evans, Peter B., 1999.
"Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
qt0sb0w38d, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000. "Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January.
- Tirole, Jean, 1994.
""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality,"
IDEI Working Papers
38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
- Tirole, J., 1993. "A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," Working papers 93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November.
- Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
- Axel Dreher & Friedrich Schneider, 2006.
"Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1653, CESifo Group Munich.
- Axel Dreher & Friedrich Schneider, 2010. "Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 215-238, July.
- Axel Dreher & Friedrich G. Schneider, 2006. "Corruption and the shadow economy: An empirical analysis," Economics working papers 2006-03, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Axel Dreher & Friedrich Schneider, 2006. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis," KOF Working papers 06-123, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Axel Dreher & Friedrich Schneider, 2006. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-01, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Dreher, Axel & Schneider, Friedrich, 2006. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 1936, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Raaj Sah, 2005.
"Corruption Across Countries and Regions: Some Consequences of Local Osmosis,"
10-2005, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Sah, Raaj, 2007. "Corruption across countries and regions: Some consequences of local osmosis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(8), pages 2573-2598, August.
- Raaj Sah, 2006. "Corruption Across Countries and Regions: Some Consequences of Local Osmosis," Working Papers 0609, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
- Sah, R.K., 1988. "Persistence And Pervasiveness Of Corruption: New Perspectives," Papers 560, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Olken, Benjamin A., 2006. "Corruption and the costs of redistribution: Micro evidence from Indonesia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 853-870, May.
- Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
- Gupta, Sanjeev & de Mello, Luiz & Sharan, Raju, 2001. "Corruption and military spending," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 749-777, November.
- Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
- S. Loddo, 2004. "Old and new intervention Policy: a survey of empirical studies for the Mezzogiorno," Working Paper CRENoS 200401, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:159. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.