Political Competition in Economic Perspective
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More about this item
Keywordspolitical competition; accountability; competitive populism;
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- P11 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
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