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Walk the Line: Conflict, State Capacity and the Political Dynamics of Reform

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  • Jain, Sanjay

    (Cambridge University)

  • Majumdar, Sumon

    (Queen’s University)

  • Mukand, Sharun

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic framework to analyze the political sustainability of economic reforms in developing countries. First, we demonstrate that economic reforms that are proceeding successfully may run into a political impasse, with the reform’s initial success having a negative impact on its political sustainability. Second, we demonstrate that greater state capacity, to make compensatory transfers to those adversely a.ected by reform, need not always help the political sustainability of reform, but can also hinder it. Finally, we argue that in ethnically divided societies, economic reform may be completed not despite ethnic conflict, but because of it.

Suggested Citation

  • Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon & Mukand, Sharun, 2013. "Walk the Line: Conflict, State Capacity and the Political Dynamics of Reform," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 156, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cge:wacage:156
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    Cited by:

    1. Rodrik, Dani & Ash, Elliott & Mukand, Sharun, 2021. "Economic Interests, Worldviews, and Identities: Theory and Evidence on Ideational Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 16699, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Sharun Mukand & Dani Rodrik, 2018. "The Political Economy of Ideas: On Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking," NBER Working Papers 24467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Mukand, Sharun W. & Rodrik, Dani, 2018. "The Political Economy of Ideas," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1163, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Bonatti, Luigi & Fracasso, Andrea, 2019. "Policy inertia, self-defeating expectations and structural reforms: can policy modeling cope?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 943-962.
    5. Mukand, Sharun W. & Rodrik, Dani, 2018. "The Political Economy of Ideas," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 370, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    6. Sanjay Jain, 2017. "Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection," WIDER Working Paper Series 044, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Sanjay Jain, 2017. "Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-44, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    8. Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon, 2016. "State capacity, redistributive compensation and the political economy of economic policy reform," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 462-473.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic Reform; State Capacity; Politics; Redistribution; Compensation; Ethnic Conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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