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Who Wants To Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions

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  • DENISOVA, IRINA
  • ELLER, MARKUS
  • FRYE, TIMOTHY
  • ZHURAVSKAYA, EKATERINA

Abstract

Using survey data from 28 transition countries, we test for the complementarity and substitutability of market-relevant skills and institutions. We show that democracy and good governance complement market skills in transition economies. Under autocracy and weak governance institutions, there is no significant difference in support for revising privatization between high- and low-skilled respondents. As the level of democracy and the quality of governance increases, the difference in the level of support for revising privatization between the high and low skilled grows dramatically. This finding contributes to our understanding of microfoundations of the politics of economic reform.

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  • Denisova, Irina & Eller, Markus & Frye, Timothy & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2009. "Who Wants To Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 284-304, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:103:y:2009:i:02:p:284-304_09
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • O0 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - General
    • P0 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General

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