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Left, right, left: income, learning and political dynamics

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  • Morrow, John
  • Carter, Michael

Abstract

The political left turn in Latin America, which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more, challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior. This paper generalizes the forward-looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic, non-concave income processes. The model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present. In contrast, under imperfect information, a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences occurs. Simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that imperfect information better accounts for the shift back to the left, and offers additional insights about political dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Morrow, John & Carter, Michael, 2013. "Left, right, left: income, learning and political dynamics," MPRA Paper 45020, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:45020
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    Cited by:

    1. Anderson, Kym & Strutt, Anna, 2014. "Food security policy options for China: Lessons from other countries," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(P1), pages 50-58.
    2. Sweder J. G. van Wijnbergen & Tim Willems, 2016. "Learning Dynamics and Support for Economic Reforms: Why Good News Can Be Bad," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 30(1), pages 1-23.
    3. Kym Anderson, 2016. "Agricultural Trade, Policy Reforms, and Global Food Security," Palgrave Studies in Agricultural Economics and Food Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-46925-0, December.
    4. Marcus André Melo & Armando Barrientos & André Canuto Coelho, 2014. "Taxation, redistribution and the social contract in Brazil," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series iriba_wp11, GDI, The University of Manchester.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    income dynamics; redistributive politics; polarization; Bayesian learning; Latin America;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • P1 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies

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