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Crises, institutions politiques et réformes politiques : le bon, le mauvais et l'affreux

  • Mariano Tommasi

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Article provided by De Boeck Université in its journal Revue d'économie du développement.

Volume (Year): 11 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 49-81

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Handle: RePEc:cai:edddbu:edd_172_0049
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  1. Miguel Braun & Mariano Tommasi, 2004. "Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some organizing principles and Latin American experiences," Public Economics 0410004, EconWPA.
  2. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller & Ernesto Stein, 2003. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes. An Intertemporal Transactions Framework," Working Papers 59, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2003.
  3. Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
  4. Moe, Terry M, 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 213-53.
  5. Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China," Papers 30-97, Tel Aviv.
  6. Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Juliana Bambaci & Tamara Saront & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "The Political Economy of Economic Reforms in Argentina," Working Papers 43, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2002.
  8. Eduardo Lora, 2001. "Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 39858, Inter-American Development Bank.
  9. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1993. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Economic History 9309003, EconWPA.
  10. Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, 1999. "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: a Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence," Working Papers 9912, Economic Research Forum, revised Apr 1999.
  11. Katharina PISTOR, 2000. "The Standardization Of Law And Its Effect On Developing Economies," G-24 Discussion Papers 4, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
  12. Eduardo Lora, 2000. "What Makes Reforms Likely?: Timing and Sequencing of Structural Reforms in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6472, Inter-American Development Bank.
  13. North, Douglass C, 1994. "Economic Performance through Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 359-68, June.
  14. Guillermo Mondino & Federico Sturzenegger & Mariano Tommasi, 1992. "Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization, A Dynamic Game," UCLA Economics Working Papers 678, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Sebastian Edwards, 1997. "Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?," NBER Working Papers 5978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Dani Rodrik, 2000. "Participatory Politics, Social Cooperation, and Economic Stability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 140-144, May.
  17. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
  18. Kanbur, Ravi, 2001. "Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty: The Nature of Disagreements," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1083-1094, June.
  19. Mukand, Sharun W., 2006. "Globalization and the `confidence game'," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 406-427, December.
  20. Mariano Tommasi & Andres Velasco, 1996. "Where are we in the political economy of reform?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 187-238.
  21. Krueger, Anne O, 1993. "Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 351-55, May.
  22. John Williamson, 1994. "The Political Economy of Policy Reform," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 68.
  23. Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Federalism in Argentina and the Reforms of the 1990s," Working Papers 48, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2002.
  24. Posen, Adam S, 1998. "Do Better Institutions Make Better Policy? Review," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 173-205, October.
  25. Mukand, Sharun W. & Rodrik, Dani, 2002. "In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation and Economic Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3525, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Sebastian Galiani & Daniel Heymann & Mariano Tommasi, 2003. "Great Expectations and Hard Times: The Argentine Convertibility Plan," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, January.
  27. Mariano Tommasi & Mark P. Jones & Sebastian M. Saiegh & Pablo T. Spiller, 2002. "Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Argentine Congress," Working Papers 31, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2002.
  28. Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, January.
  29. Mariano Tommasi & Matias Iaryczower & Pablo T. Spiller, 2002. "Judicial Decision Making in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998," Working Papers 30, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2002.
  30. Douglas Nelson, 1989. "The Political Economy Of Trade Policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 301-314, November.
  31. Laban, Raul & Sturzenegger, Federico, 1994. "Fiscal conservatism as a response to the debt crisis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 305-324, December.
  32. Bruno, Michael, 1993. "Crisis, Stabilization, and Economic Reform: Therapy by Consensus," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198286639.
  33. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
  34. Lohmann, Susanne, 2000. "Sollbruchstelle: Deep Uncertainty and the Design of Monetary Institutions," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 391-411, November.
  35. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
  36. Avinash Dixit & Gene M. Grossman & Faruk Gul, 2000. "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 531-568, June.
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