IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/wpaper/3227.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Actores con veto, instituciones caprichosas y políticas de mala calidad: el proceso de diseño de políticas de Ecuador

Author

Listed:
  • Andrés Mejía Acosta
  • María Caridad Araujo
  • Anibal Pérez-Liñán
  • Sebastian Saiegh

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se procura entender por qué los actores políticos, las instituciones y las reformas legales han dejado sistemáticamente de generar cooperación en el proceso de diseño de políticas de Ecuador. Desde un punto de vista comparativo e histórico, Ecuador ha estado atrapado en un ciclo de políticas de mala calidad que no se ajustan a las circunstancias, que fluctúan según los caprichos políticos del momento y que tienden a favorecer a los grupos de cabildeo bien organizados en vez de procurar resultados sociales óptimos. En este trabajo se identifican dos rutas alternativas para el diseño de políticas que conducen a resultados precarios. En la primera, el programa del Ejecutivo pasa a un segundo plano detrás de las demandas clientelares de corto plazo de múltiples actores con veto en el Poder Legislativo, lo que contribuye al estancamiento o la rigidez de las políticas. En la segunda, el poder del Ejecutivo se delega en una burocracia decisiva y a menudo técnica, que está aislada de las presiones políticas, pero la falta de estabilidad institucional de tales cuerpos lleva a un patrón de inestabilidad de las políticas. Por último, en este trabajo se tratan los papeles formales e informales de los actores con veto de ultima instancia para detener o hacer retroceder políticas no deseadas. También se presentan dos estudios de casos específicos de políticas fiscales y monetarias, y se deducen implicaciones empíricas para mejorar la formación de acuerdos duraderos en el cuerpo legislativo y asegurar la aplicación y cumplimiento estable de las políticas a través de una burocracia técnica y un Poder Judicial independiente.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Mejía Acosta & María Caridad Araujo & Anibal Pérez-Liñán & Sebastian Saiegh, 2006. "Actores con veto, instituciones caprichosas y políticas de mala calidad: el proceso de diseño de políticas de Ecuador," Research Department Publications 3227, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3227
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=R-523&pub_file_name=pubR-523.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eduardo Lora & Ugo Panizza, 2002. "Structural Reforms in Latin America under Scrutiny," Research Department Publications 4301, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Mershon, Carol, 1996. "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 534-554, September.
    3. Eduardo Lora, 1997. "A Decade of Structural Reform in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It," Research Department Publications 4074, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. Mariano Tommasi & Mark P. Jones & Sebastian M. Saiegh & Pablo T. Spiller, 2002. "Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Argentine Congress," Working Papers 31, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2002.
    5. Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
    6. Michael Gavin & Ricardo Hausmann & Roberto Perotti & Ernesto Talvi, 1996. "Managing Fiscal Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Volatility, Procyclicality, and Limited Creditworthiness," Research Department Publications 4032, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    7. Lora, Eduardo, 2001. "Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3338, Inter-American Development Bank.
    8. Ernesto H. Stein & Jeffry Frieden, 2000. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Latin America: An Analytical Overview," Research Department Publications 3118, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Ernesto Talvi & Carlos A. Vegh, 2000. "Tax Base Variability and Procyclical Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 7499, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Eduardo Lora & Ugo Panizza, 2002. "Structural Reforms in Latin America under Scrutiny," Research Department Publications 4301, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    11. Mariano Tommasi & Matias Iaryczower & Pablo T. Spiller, 2002. "Judicial Decision Making in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998," Working Papers 30, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2002.
    12. Cheibub, Jos㉠Antonio & Przeworski, Adam & Saiegh, Sebastian M., 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 565-587, October.
    13. Ernesto H. Stein & Natalia Salazar & Roberto Steiner & Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla & Marco Bonomo & Juan C. Jaramillo & Hector E. Schamis & Alberto Pascó-Front & Piero Ghezzi & Maria Cristina Terra & José De, 2001. "The Currency Game: Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 77398 edited by Ernesto H. Stein & Jeffry Frieden, February.
    14. Machado, Roberto & Morley, Samuel A. & Pettinato, Stefano, 1999. "Indexes of structural reform in Latin America," Series Históricas 7453, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    15. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521429900.
    16. repec:idb:wpaper:326 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. repec:idb:brikps:77398 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Michael Gavin & Ricardo Hausmann & Roberto Perotti & Ernesto Talvi, 1996. "Managing Fiscal Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Volatility, Procyclicality, and Limited Creditworthiness," Research Department Publications 4032, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    19. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521419628.
    20. Hallerberg, Mark & Marier, Patrick, 2001. "Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Carribean countries," ZEI Working Papers B 17-2001, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    21. Helmke, Gretchen, 2002. "The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court–Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(2), pages 291-303, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrés Mejía Acosta & María Caridad Araujo & Anibal Pérez-Liñán & Sebastian Saiegh, 2006. "Veto Players, Fickle Institutions and Low-Quality Policies: The Policymaking Process in Ecuador," Research Department Publications 3226, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Sebastian Saiegh & Marcela Montero & Anibal Pérez-Liñán & José Molinas, 2006. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes in Paraguay, 1954-2003," Research Department Publications 3194, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    3. Sebastian Saiegh & Marcela Montero & Anibal Pérez-Liñán & José Molinas, 2006. "Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de políticas en Paraguay, 1954-2003," Research Department Publications 3195, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. Birdsall, Nancy & de la Torre, Augusto & Caicedo, Felipe Valencia, 2010. "The Washington consensus : assessing a damaged brand," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5316, The World Bank.
    5. Molinas, José R. & Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal & Saiegh, Sebastián & Montero, Marcela, 2006. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes in Paraguay, 1954-2003," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3359, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Mariano Tommasi & Alvaro Forteza & German Herrera, 2005. "Understanding Reform in Latin America," Working Papers 88, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Dec 2005.
    7. Mariano Tommasi, 2003. "Crises, institutions politiques et réformes politiques : le bon, le mauvais et l'affreux," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 11(2), pages 49-81.
    8. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller & Ernesto Stein, 2003. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes. An Intertemporal Transactions Framework," Working Papers 59, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2003.
    9. Hausmann, Ricardo & Rodrik, Dani, 2003. "Economic development as self-discovery," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 603-633, December.
    10. Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Federalism in Argentina and the Reforms of the 1990s," Working Papers 48, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2002.
    11. Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Crisis, Political Institutions and Policy Reform: It Is Not the Policy, It Is the Polity, Stupid," Working Papers 49, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jun 2004.
    12. Hofstetter, Marc, 2008. "Disinflations in Latin America and the Caribbean: A free lunch?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 327-345, March.
    13. Mariano Tommasi, 2006. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 1-36, January.
    14. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    15. Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2006. "Growth and Reforms in Latin America: A Survey of Facts and Arguments," IMF Working Papers 2006/210, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen, 2011. "How soon is now? The effects of the IMF on economic reforms in Latin America," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 189-213, July.
    17. Scartascini, Carlos, 2007. "The Institutional Determinants of Political Transactions," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1961, Inter-American Development Bank.
    18. Alvaro Forteza & Daniel Buquet & Mario Ibarburu & Jorge Lanzaro & Andrés Pereyra & Eduardo Siandra & Marcel Vaillant, 2003. "Understanding reform. The Uruguayan case," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0603, Department of Economics - dECON.
    19. Nauro F. Campos & Paul De Grauwe & Yuemei Ji, 2017. "Structural Reforms, Growth and Inequality: An Overview of Theory, Measurement and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 6812, CESifo.
    20. Mario Bergara & Daniel Chasquetti & Juan Andrés Moraes, 2005. "The Political Economy of the Budgetary Process in Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1905, Department of Economics - dECON.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3227. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Felipe Herrera Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iadbbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.