The Dynamics of Political Compromise
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- Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1988. "Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 541-554.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:03:p:567-580_20 is not listed on IDEAS
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
- Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996.
"Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609.
- Narayana Kocherlakota, 2010. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing Without Commitment," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2053, David K. Levine.
- Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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