La economía política de la política fiscal
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More about this item
Keywordsvotante mediano; convergencia; divergencia; volatilidad de políticas; actores de veto;
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-13 (All new papers)
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