Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
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- W. Robert Reed, 1994. "A Retrospective Voting Model With Heterogeneous Politicians," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 39-58, 03.
- Stamland, Tommy, 1999. "Partially Informative Signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 148-161, November.
- Joseph E. Harrington & Jr., 1999. "Rigidity of Social Systems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 40-64, February.
- S Brock Blomberg & Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2000. "A Theory of Rigid Extremists and Flexible Moderates With An Empirical Application To The US Congress," Economics Working Paper Archive 380, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
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