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The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises

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  • Harrington Jr. , Joseph E.

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  • Harrington Jr. , Joseph E., 1993. "The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 71-97, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:1:p:71-97
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 863-894.
    2. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 306-332.
    3. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    4. Hillas, John, 1990. "On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1365-1390, November.
    5. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1003-1037.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rui Baleiras & Vasco Santos, 2000. "Behavioral and Institutional Determinants of Political Business Cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 121-147, July.
    2. repec:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:348-367 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Westermark, Andreas, 1999. "Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity," Working Paper Series 1999:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    4. Pokladniková, Vlasta & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2009. "Moderation of an ideological party," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 516-537, March.
    5. Tangeras, T.P., 1998. "On the Role of Public Opinion Polls in Political Competition," Papers 655, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    6. Westermark, Andreas, 2004. "Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 421-452, May.
    7. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 159-179.
    8. Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
    9. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2013. "A Political Theory of Populism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 771-805.
    10. Rombouts Jeroen V. K. & Bouaddi Mohammed, 2009. "Mixed Exponential Power Asymmetric Conditional Heteroskedasticity," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, pages 1-32.
    11. Etienne Farvaque & Gael Lagadec, 2009. "Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale," CESifo Working Paper Series 2522, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Westermark, Andreas, 2001. "Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises," Working Paper Series 568, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    13. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl, Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2015. "Promises, policies and pocketbook voting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 177-194.
    14. Randolph Sloof & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 81-120, July.
    15. G. Bellettini & P. Roberti, 2016. "Politicians' coherence and government debt," Working Papers wp1087, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    16. Bac, Mehmet, 2001. "To invest or screen efficiently: a potential conflict in relationships governed by incomplete contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 567-588.
    17. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 126-143.

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