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The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Walkowitz, Gari & Weiss, Arne R., 2017. "“Read my lips! (but only if I was elected)!” Experimental evidence on the effects of electoral competition on promises, shirking and trust," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 348-367.
  2. Westermark, Andreas, 2004. "Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 421-452, May.
  3. Pokladniková, Vlasta & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2009. "Moderation of an ideological party," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 516-537, March.
  4. Tangeras, T.P., 1998. "On the Role of Public Opinion Polls in Political Competition," Papers 655, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  5. Tsur, Yacov, 2022. "Political tenure, term limits and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  6. Haifeng Huang, 2010. "Electoral Competition When Some Candidates Lie and Others Pander," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 333-358, July.
  7. Giorgio Bellettini & Paolo Roberti, 2020. "Politicians’ coherence and government debt," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 73-91, January.
  8. Lim, Wooyoung, 2014. "Communication in bargaining over decision rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 159-179.
  9. Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
  10. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2023. "Can resource windfalls reduce corruption? The role of term limits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  11. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2026. "Multidimensional Signaling and the Rise of Cultural Politics," Working Papers 2026-34, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  12. Sugato Dasgupta & Kenneth C. Williams, 2002. "A Principal-Agent Model of Elections with Novice Incumbents," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 409-438, October.
  13. Elena Panova, 2008. "Campaign Promises and Political Factions," Cahiers de recherche 0801, CIRPEE.
  14. Etienne Farvaque & Gael Lagadec, 2009. "Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale," CESifo Working Paper Series 2522, CESifo.
  15. Baleiras, Rui Nuno & Santos, Vasco, 2000. "Behavioral and Institutional Determinants of Political Business Cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 121-147, July.
  16. Marco A. Haan & Bart Los & Sander Onderstal & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2010. "Punching above One's Weight: The Case against Election Campaigns," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-056/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  17. Westermark, Andreas, 2001. "Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises," Working Paper Series 568, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  18. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2013. "A Political Theory of Populism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(2), pages 771-805.
  19. Benczes, István & Szabó, Krisztina, 2023. "Társadalmi törésvonalak és gazdasági (ir)racionalitások. A közgazdaságtan szerepe és helye a populizmus kutatásában [Social cleavages and economic (ir)rationalities: The role of economics in populism research]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 23-54.
  20. Mahenc, Philippe, 2025. "Penetration or skimming pricing for credence products?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
  21. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl, Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2015. "Promises, policies and pocketbook voting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 177-194.
  22. Randolph Sloof & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 81-120, July.
  23. Bac, Mehmet, 2001. "To invest or screen efficiently: a potential conflict in relationships governed by incomplete contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 567-588, March.
  24. Francesc Dilmé, 2024. "A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 673-693, June.
  25. Marco A. Haan & Sander Onderstal & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2024. "Punching above One’s Weight–On Overcommitment in Election Campaigns," De Economist, Springer, vol. 172(2), pages 121-139, June.
  26. Yasushi Asako, 2015. "Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 613-649, October.
  27. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.
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